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246 abstract
This paper analyses Croatian mandatory pension funds’ investment returns dur-
ing the 2005-2014 period using performance attribution methodology. Results 
from active investment management are compared to a long-term policy return. 
Such analysis is essential to shed light on the contribution of active portfolio man-
agement in the second pillar pension scheme. Evidence suggests that in the period 
analysed portfolio managers have added value through active management deci-
sions. In addition, we determined the sources of portfolio return by breaking down 
active return into policy, tactical asset allocation and security selection effect.
Keywords: pension funds, performance attribution, policy return, active return, 
allocation effect, security selection effect 
1 IntRoDUctIon
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether mandatory pension fund man-
agers in Croatia have added or destroyed value for the second pillar pension fund 
members during the 2005-2014 period. We have based our analysis on perform-
ance attribution methodology. In the first part of the paper we present a short 
overview of the second pillar pension system in Croatia. We then describe the 
methodological framework used in the study and present the concerns and diffi-
culties we were faced with when applying it to the Croatian mandatory pension 
funds. Finally, we present the results of our study: evidence suggests that active 
management has added around 77 basis points of return per year during the period 
we analysed. 
2 oVeRVIeW of tHe PensIon sYsteM In cRoatIa
In 2002 a pension system reform in Croatia introduced second and third pillar 
privately managed mandatory and voluntary pension funds to complement the 
existing government-sponsored system based on the principle of solidarity. The 
third pillar of the system consists of voluntary pension funds with purely volun-
tary contributions and is not analysed in this paper. At the same time, mandatory 
employees’ contributions to the existing first pillar “pay as you go” system were 
partially redirected to second pillar “defined contribution” pension funds where 
individual pension assets have gradually been built up and invested in capital 
markets. The market consists of four mandatory pension fund management com-
panies. Until 2014 each of these companies managed one pension fund and all the 
participants were assuming the same risk profile. A proxy life-cycle model intro-
duced in 2014 saw the creation of three mandatory pension fund categories with 
different risk profiles: models A, B and C. Each of the management companies 
must offer all three models to the system participants. Model B funds, in terms of 
investment strategy and limits as well as assets under management, are clearly the 
successors of the funds created in 2002. We assumed this when constructing the 
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247Our study concentrates on the performance results of mandatory pension funds (B 
model funds after July 2014) during the 2005-2014 period. During that decade 
assets under management grew from 8 billion HRK to 65 billion HRK (8.5 bln 
EUR). Mandatory pension funds had 1.7 million members at the end of 2014. 
Their assets represented almost 20% of the GDP of Croatia.  
3 fRaMeWoRK 
The methodological framework used in this paper is based on that presented in the 
study by Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986): actual returns of the pension funds 
are compared with a “benchmark” return reflecting the investment policy. The 
investment policy identifies the long-term asset allocation plan, including normal 
asset classes and normal weights. Hoernemann, Junkans and Zarate (2005:26) 
define an investment policy as “the basic long-term mix of assets that is most 
likely to help meet the investor’s long-term investment performance and risk ob-
jectives”. An investment policy is sometimes also referred to as normal, long-term 
or strategic asset allocation. This framework identifies three sources of return in 
the investment management process: investment policy return, market timing and 
security selection. “Timing is the strategic under or overweighting of an asset 
class relative to its normal weight, for purposes of return enhancement and/or risk 
reduction” (Brinson, Hood and Beebower, 1986:40). Market timing is also re-
ferred to as “tactical asset allocation” in Hoernemann, Junkans and Zarate (2005). 
“Security selection is the active selection of investments within an asset class” 
(Brinson, Hood and Beebower, 1986:40). Morningstar’s Methodology Paper 
(2011) states that the allocation effect as presented in Brinson, Hood and Bee-
bower (1986) was not acceptable in its original form. We have, therefore, used, in 
equation 3, the formula presented by Brinson and Fachler (1985), because, ac-
cording to Morningstar’s Methodology Paper (2011), it is in line with contempo-
rary approaches to component-level attribution and is not in conflict with the for-
mula presented in Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986) because their results 
match at the portfolio level. 
In order to calculate the benchmark return, Rb, the actual portfolio return, Rp, the 
allocation effect, All, and selection effect, Sel, for any given period, we need: 
(a) the normal (or benchmark) weights for n asset classes i: wb,i 
(b) the actual weights of all asset classes in the funds: wp,i
(c) the benchmark returns assigned to each asset class: rb,i
(d) the actual return of each asset class in the fund portfolios: rp,i.


















































































The decomposition of returns as shown in equation (5) can easily be demonstrated 
from equations (1) to (4).
 Rp = Rb + All + Sel (5)
This simple framework is illustrated in figure 1. The area encompassing the three 
rectangles Rb, Sel and All, represents the total return of the portfolio, Rp. Rb is the 
policy return – the return that would have been achieved by the fund managers if 
they invested passively in the benchmark portfolio respecting the defined long-
term weights of each asset class. The All rectangle represents the portion of port-
folio return resulting from active allocation decisions – the variation in actual 
weights of asset classes compared with the normal weights. The Sel rectangle 
represents the portion of portfolio return resulting from active security selection 
decisions – divergence in selection of individual securities and/or their weight in 
actual portfolios compared to the benchmark portfolios.  
Figure 1










In Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986) the active return is broken down into allo-
cation, selection and interaction effects. The interaction effect is a small part of the 
active return that is simultaneously the result of allocation and selection decisions. 
In figure 1, it would have been represented by the rectangle (rp,i – rb,i)*(wp,i – wb,i) 
where Sel would have been (rp,i – rb,i)*wb,i. For the sake of transparency, we would 
like to point out that results for the selection effect calculated in this paper encom-
pass both the selection and the interaction effect from the original Brinson, Hood 
and Beebower study and corresponds to equation (4). This is due to the fact that we 
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2494 tHe stUDY
In our study we used monthly data for the ten years period beginning in January 
2005 and ending in December 2014. All four mandatory pension funds active in 
Croatia were included. Data sets for actual portfolio weights and returns were con-
structed using the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency’s (HANFA) 
monthly reports, pension funds’ annual financial statements and the HANFA inter-
nal database. When calculating average returns and portfolio structure data at the 
industry level we used simple arithmetic means. We believe that using asset weig-
hted averaging would have distorted the results in favour of larger pension funds.   
In order to define normal asset classes and weights for our benchmark portfolio we 
analysed the historical structure of the portfolios of each of the four pension funds. 
Five asset classes were selected for our policy strategy: Croatian government bonds 
denominated in EUR or HRK, euro-zone government bonds, Croatian stocks, glo-
bal stocks and cash equivalents. Policy weights were determined based on average 
holdings of the pension funds. As explained later, we also took into account actual 
limitations of the market. Finally, we defined proxies for the normal returns of as-
set classes in our benchmark portfolio. Table 1 summarizes the data collected for 
pension funds and the benchmark indices that we selected as proxies. 
Table 1
Policy asset classes, summary of holdings for 4 pension funds and benchmark 
indices (%)



























8.50 1.20 18.04 3.67









a Top row: 2005-2006; bottom row: 2007-2014.
b Custom indices due to lack of adequate publicly available total return indices.
Source: www.hanfa.hr and HANFA internal database.
Because data was not available for actual returns of individual asset classes, rp,i, used 
in equation (2) and equation (4), we calculated actual returns for the funds’ portfo-
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250 daily unit prices. The grossing-up of returns was calculated using data about man-
agement and depositary fees from the pension funds’ annual financial statements. We 
used the formula presented in Bacon (2008, equation 2.31, p. 30). We believe that 
“before fees” returns are more appropriate for this analysis for at least two reasons: 
for the comparability between benchmark and pension fund returns and the compa-
rability between pension funds themselves across the same or different time periods. 
The selection effect, Sel, also could not be calculated at the asset class level because 
we did not have rp,i data. We instead derived it from equation (5).
 Sel = Rp – (Rb + All) (6)
As already mentioned, our calculations were performed on monthly data. We geo-
metrically linked monthly returns to obtain returns for longer periods. The selec-
tion and allocation effects were also calculated on a monthly basis. These effects 
are additive at a single period level. However, they can’t simply be added or geo-
metrically linked across multiple periods. In order to achieve additivity, we used 
the Cariño’s logarithmic linking coefficient as demonstrated in Bacon (2008:191-
194). The linking coefficient was applied to monthly asset-class level allocation 
effects and monthly total selection effects.  
In our study we assumed that the benchmark portfolio was realigned every month 
with the long-term asset allocation mix. This means that the drifting of the “nor-
mal” weights due to different returns across asset classes was restricted to a one 
month period.  
Before presenting the results of the study, we will focus on four issues that, in our 
view, are crucial to the interpretation of the results.  
4.1 PolIcY asset classes
Investible asset classes are defined in article 125 of the Act on Mandatory Pension 
Funds (2014). These are, in a nutshell, central and local government bonds, corpo-
rate bonds, stocks, deposits and cash equivalents. Issuers must be from EU (includ-
ing Croatia) or OECD countries. Exposure to these asset classes can also be achieved 
through investment in UCITS funds and derivative instruments. Alternative invest-
ment funds as defined by the EU Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Manag-
ers are allowed and could theoretically lead to exposure to alternative asset classes. 
Although the investment limits do not directly discriminate against geographical 
diversification of funds’ assets, article 129 of the Act states, for B model funds, that 
at least 60% of the funds’ assets must be traded in local currency. Earlier regulation 
prescribed mandatory investments in Croatian government bonds.
Analysis of actual asset allocations clearly showed that all four funds invested 
most of their assets in Croatian government bonds denominated in HRK or EUR 
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251class consists of these bonds. Euro-zone government bonds represent our second 
asset class. We hesitated to include them in our study because of their relatively 
low weight in most periods. However, we believe that they deserve to be repre-
sented as a particular asset class at least to highlight the “home bias” evident in 
fund managers’ decisions. Thirdly, Croatian stocks represent a separate asset class 
because we detected a very clear “home bias” there too, despite the very small size 
and low liquidity of the market. The fourth asset class is global stocks. Unlike 
bonds, where investments were constrained to the euro, the four pension funds we 
analysed invested in stocks globally despite currency risk. Finally, the fifth asset 
class represented in our study is cash equivalent instruments. They appear mostly 
as a liquidity reserve position and are temporarily built up in advance of govern-
ment bond issues. Cash equivalent instruments are exclusively domestic.   
Other investments were also present in the funds’ portfolios. However, we did not 
create a separate asset class for them. We rather allocated them to one of the 
above-defined five asset classes: particular UCITS funds and alternative funds 
were allocated depending on their individual investment policies, Croatian and 
foreign corporate and municipal bonds were respectively allocated to Croatian 
government and euro-zone government bonds. Alternative funds were mostly 
Croatian equity funds with insignificant amounts invested in real-estate and pri-
vate equity funds. We therefore added them to the Croatian stocks asset class.  
4.2 bencHMaRK InDIces 
Choosing appropriate benchmark indices for local asset classes was a very diffi-
cult task because there are no publicly available total return indices covering the 
entire period. The Zagreb Stock Exchange started publishing its Crobex Total Re-
turn equity index only in February 2014. To overcome this, we first used data 
available for the Crobex index from 2005 to 2014 and “grossed it up” with an as-
sumed evenly distributed annual dividend yield of 3%. However, this approxima-
tion proved to be inappropriate because according to article 69 of the Act on Man-
datory and Voluntary Pension Funds (1999) pension funds were allowed to invest 
exclusively in the first quotation of the Zagreb Stock Exchange while the Crobex 
index also included stocks traded in lower segments of the market. Practically, this 
meant that we could not use the Crobex index to represent our normal asset class 
for the full period of the study because most of the stocks included in the Crobex 
index were not directly investible for pension funds. The ban on stocks out of the 
first quotation was lifted in 2007 with amendments to the Act on Mandatory and 
Voluntary Pension Funds (1999). More detailed implementation rules were given 
in article 4 of the Regulation on Additional Investment Criteria and Limits for 
Pension Funds in December 2007. In order to avoid inconsistencies, we decided 
to create a custom total return free float capitalisation weighted index including 
only the stocks in the first quotation for 2005 and 2006. From January 2007 we 
used the “grossed up” Crobex return, mostly because the assets under manage-
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252 used to achieve indirect exposure to the broader Crobex index. We named this 
blended index Crostock. Hence, our custom index for the first two years is very 
poorly diversified, just as were the domestic stock portfolios of pension funds. In 
2005 it consisted of stocks of only five companies (Croatia osiguranje, Istraturist, 
Medika, Pliva and Podravka). INA and Viro were added to that list in 2006. Our 
custom index is dominated by Pliva until October 2006. It is also marked by the 
inclusion of INA late in 2006. The difference in total return between the original 
Crobex index (not including dividends) and our custom Crostock index is substan-
tial, not only because of the effect of dividends. While the Crobex index increased 
by 11.61% (1.1% annually), the Crostock index had a total return of 84.56% 
(6.32% annually). The difference was most substantial in 2006 when the custom 
Crostock index outperformed the Crobex index by as much as 47.68 percentage 
points. This is because most of the stocks quoted on the first quotation of the Za-
greb Stock Exchange posted impressive returns in 2006 and because the weights 
of the individual stocks within the index fluctuated wildly. Firstly, Pliva’s free 
float decreased sharply after a takeover bid, leading to an increase in the weight of 
other companies’ stocks. Secondly, the inception of INA into the first quotation of 
the Zagreb Stock Exchange led to a decrease in the weights of all other compa-
nies. Table 2 gives yearly returns of the Crobex and Crostock indices. Using the 
publicly available Crobex index in our study without any customization would 
have resulted in a much higher outperformance of pension funds compared to the 
investment policy return. It is interesting to note that the “grossed up” Crobex 
index, the use of which we abandoned, would have demonstrated a compound 
annual rate of return of only 4.27%, making it the worst performing asset class in 
the 2005-2014 period. From table 3 we can see that Croatian stocks have the high-
est standard deviation of monthly returns making them the riskiest asset class. The 
fact that using modified data for only 2 years out of 10 (2005 and 2006) added up 
205 basis points annually to the return of the Croatian stocks asset class shows 
how delicate a task it is to define an adequate benchmark. This is obviously an 
important but unavoidable shortcoming of our study. A discussion on the merits of 
Croatian stocks in pension funds’ portfolios is beyond the scope of this paper.
 
A local asset management company calculated and published on Bloomberg a 
total return, market value weighted, Croatian government bond index for EUR 
and HRK denominated bonds, called CROBOND. This index included Eurobonds 
denominated in EUR, local bonds traded in HRK but linked to the EUR (“cur-
rency clause” bonds) and pure HRK bonds. Such an index was, in our opinion, a 
good representative of the pension funds’ investment policies. Unfortunately, the 
CROBOND index (Bloomberg ticker ZBIBOND Index) covers only the period 
until September 2013. The Zagreb Stock Exchange started publishing a total re-
turn bond index in December 2011. We did not use it to construct our custom in-
dex because it does not include Croatian Eurobond issues. To complete our data 
set from September 2013 to December 2014 we used data on all Croatian govern-
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253pension fund management companies. We tailored it to our needs by including 
only HRK and EUR denominated bonds (including “currency clause” bonds) and 
excluding USD bonds. We called this blended index Crogov. 
Table 2












Return over period 11.61 85.71
Source: Zagreb Stock Exchange, authors’ calculations.
As with stocks and bonds, there is no publicly available index for the HRK money 
market. Market data from which an index could be constructed retroactively are 
also not readily available. Therefore, we decided to create a proxy for the HRK 
money market asset class return by using equally weighted returns of the four 
largest HRK denominated money market funds in Croatia (ZB plus, PBZ novčani, 
Raiffeisen cash, Erste novčani). All four funds were active through the entire pe-
riod covered by our study. We “grossed up” net-of-fees returns for the funds using 
the same methodology we used for grossing up pension fund returns and called 
this index Cromm. We believe that money market funds return is a valid bench-
mark for the cash equivalent asset class.
For the euro-zone government bonds asset class we selected the Bloomberg/Effas 
Euro bloc government bond index (Bloomberg ticker EUGATR Index). Finally, 
for the global stocks, we chose the MSCI World index (unhedged, Bloomberg 
ticker NDDUWI Index). The pension funds mostly achieved exposure to global 
stock markets through direct investments in individual stocks without searching to 
diversify their portfolio. At the same time, they invested in particular market seg-
ments through ETFs probably depending on their market forecasts at that time. 
We used an unhedged rather than a euro-hedged index because currency exposure 
restrictions in the Act on Mandatory and Voluntary Pension Funds (1999) applied 
until 2014 and did not recognize currency hedging as a means of increasing al-
lowed investments out of Croatia. 
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254 Table 3 shows compound annual returns, standard deviations of monthly returns 
and the correlation matrix of monthly returns for the benchmark indices. It is in-
teresting to note that Croatian government bonds and Croatian equity exhibit only 
a moderate positive correlation of monthly returns with euro-zone government 
bonds and global stocks respectively.     
Table 3







correlation of monthly returns
crogov eUGatR crostock nDDUWI cromm
Crogov 5.53 1.17   1 0.44 0.26 0.31 -0.02
EUGATR 4.92 1.35 0.44    1 -0.25 -0.02 0.04
Crostock 6.32 8.10 0.26 -0.25    1 0.47 -0.03
NDDUWI 7.22 3.84 0.31 -0.02 0.47    1 -0.09
Cromm 4.77 0.18 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.09     1
Source: Bloomberg, Zagreb Stock Exchange.
4.3 PolIcY WeIGHts
In Brinson (1986), long-term average exposures were used as normal weights for 
the selected asset classes. Initially we planned to use the same approach because 
there is no publicly determined benchmark for the industry as a whole or for indi-
vidual funds. However, in addition to the difficulties with the selection of bench-
mark indices for Croatian asset classes, we encountered difficulties with the set-
ting of “normal weights”, in particular for Croatian equity. The market capitaliza-
tion and free float of the stocks included in the first quotation of the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange were too low to achieve a substantial exposure to the local market while 
direct investments out of the first quotation were prohibited until the end of 2007. 
Indirect exposure to the broader market was possible through UCITS funds; how-
ever, pension funds were allowed to invest only in funds with assets under man-
agement of over 100 million HRK and were not allowed to own more than 10% 
of the total number of units outstanding. According to data available, the maxi-
mum direct and indirect exposure to Croatian equity that could have been achieved 
by the pension funds’ managers during 2005 and 2006 was on average 7.2%. Ac-
tual exposure was 3.5%, which is, in our opinion more realistic because an expo-
sure of 7.2% implies the purchase of a very large part of the free float of all stocks 
in the first quotation. We calculated the maximum direct and indirect exposure 
applying regulatory limits to the market value of Croatian stocks listed in the first 
quotation and assets under management of investment funds pursuing “Croatian 
stocks” investment strategies. At the same time, investments outside Croatia were 
restricted to 15%. These practical limitations of the market, combined with vari-
ous subsequent changes in regulatory limits, are the main reason why domestic 
and foreign asset classes could not be approached interchangeably by portfolio 
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255policy weights covering the entire period. After thoughtful consideration, we de-
cided to use two sets of “normal weights” – one using the average exposure for the 
2005-2006 period and another one for the 2007-2014 period. These weights are 
shown in table 1. 
With the aim of performing a reality check of our results, we performed the same 
calculations using another set of “normal weights” based on regulatory invest-
ment limits. In that case also, we divided the 10 years into two sub-periods: 2005-
2006 and 2007-2014, primarily because until 2007 investments outside Croatia 
were limited to 15%. We used the principle that the “normal weight” should be in 
the middle between the regulatory minimum and maximum exposure to an asset 
class. We tried to reconcile this with the above mentioned limits on investments 
outside Croatia and foreign currency exposure limits that replaced them in 2007 
following an amendment to the Act on Mandatory and Voluntary Pension Funds. 
The results of this exercise are shown in table 4. The advantage of this approach 
is that it reduces the “home bias” and a certain “overweighting” in stocks. Despite 
some differences, results are in line with the average weights exhibited in table 1. 
This does not come as a surprise, as regulatory limits are necessarily the basis for 
the creation of strategic and tactical asset allocation within fund management 
companies. If we compare normal weights based on regulatory limits with the 
actual average asset allocation from table 1, it appears that pension funds are, 
contrary to the impression disseminated by the media, underweight Croatian gov-
ernment bonds and overweight stocks.
Table 4
“Normal weights” based on regulatory investment limits (%)
asset class 2005-2006 2007-2014
Cro. gov. bonds 75 70
Euro. gov. bonds 5 5
Cro. stocks 5 10
Global stocks 5 10
Cash equivalents 10 5
Source: Act on Mandatory and Voluntary Pension Funds (1999), Act on Mandatory Pension 
Funds (2014), authors’ calculations. 
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of benchmark indices over the life-span of the study 
and the corresponding “policy index” based on average weights. The base value 
of all indices was set to 100. We used a logarithmic scale to achieve better visibi-
lity. The picture clearly shows the dramatic development of the Crostock index: it 
reached its maximum value of around 445 in December 2007 when it achieved a 
three-year performance of 345%. During the same period, global equities as rep-
resented by the NDDUWI index rose 26%. Again, this explains why the results of 
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256 Figure 2
Benchmark indices’ and policy return from 2005 to 2014 
Source: Bloomberg, Zagreb Stock Exchange, authors’ calculations. 
4.4 tIMe HoRIZon
Privately managed second pillar mandatory pension funds started investing in May 
2002. Investment results from 2002, 2003 and 2004 were not included in our study 
due to difficulties in obtaining portfolio structure data and because assets under man-
agement were very small and grew at very high monthly rates, benefiting from the 
mandatory monthly contributions from members. Therefore, we believe that invest-
ment results from the first few years after the start of the pension reform would not 
add any value to the relevance of our study. The 10 years period included covers 79% 
of the life-span of Croatian pension funds and covers both bear and bull markets. 
Hoernemann, Junkans and Zarate (2005) argue that ten years is a relatively short 
time horizon, in particular if it covers a period that would not qualify for a “nor-
mal” financial environment. However, when Croatian pension funds are concerned 
it is the longest time horizon for which consistent information is available. On the 
other hand, the life-span of our study can hardly qualify for a particularly “normal” 
period: 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 saw one of the most severe financial cri-
ses in history, while the periods preceding and succeeding it saw an extraordinary 
run in equities. Figure 2 highlights the extraordinary bubble in Croatian equities 
that started inflating in 2005 and eventually burst in 2008. In addition, in more re-
cent years we have witnessed an unprecedented bull run in bonds. Nevertheless, we 
believe that such considerations do not affect the validity of our calculations for the 
10-year period analysed. It is not the intention of this paper to use historical data for 
making forecasts on the long-term aptitude of Croatian pension fund managers to 
outperform their investment policy return but rather to shed light on the results 
from the previous decade and hopefully set the basis for a well-reasoned debate.
70
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2575 ResUlts
We began by calculating gross-of-fees returns for each of the four mandatory pen-
sion funds. We then calculated the return of the “average fund” using simple arith-
metic average of the monthly returns of individual funds. We also calculated the 
return for the “investment policy”. The total return for the average fund was 76% 
for the 10-year period. The mean annualized compound total return was 5.82%. 
The total policy return over 10 years was 63.73%, i.e. 5.05% annually. The study 
suggests that, on average, portfolio managers of Croatian mandatory pension 
funds added 77 basis points per year through active investment management. The 
best performing fund added 125 basis points per year, while the worst performing 
fund lost 22 basis points. Only one out of four funds underperformed its bench-
mark. Figure 3 shows the performance of the “investment policy” portfolio and of 
the “average fund”.   
Figure 3
Comparative performance of the “investment policy” portfolio and the average 
fund from 2005 to 2014 (%)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The results of the performance attribution analysis suggests that the average fund 
lost 801 basis points in market timing over 10 years, and gained 2,028 basis points 
in security selection. The effects on individual funds varied from a low of -1,387 
basis points to a high of -133 basis points for tactical allocation and from a low of 
+1,044 basis points to a high of +2,570 basis points for security selection effects. 
Table 5 shows average, minimum and maximum timing and selection effects and 
actual pension funds’ returns. This wide range of results shows that portfolio man-
agers actually can to a large extent add or destroy value for pension funds’ mem-
bers through active investment decisions despite regulatory investment limits. The 
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258 while the worst performing fund showed negative total active return of 343 basis 
points, over the 10-year period analysed. The worst performing fund displayed the 
worst results in both market timing and security selection skills. However, the best 
performing fund displayed the smallest loss in market timing while the best result 
in security selection was displayed by the second worst performing fund.     
Table 5 
Actual portfolio returns, benchmark returns, timing and selection effects from 
2005 to 2014 (%)
average Minimum Maximum
Benchmark return 63.71 – –
Timing effect -8.01 -13.87 -1.33
Selection effect 20.28  10.44 25.70
Actual portfolio return 76.00  60.31 84.34
Source: Authors’ calculations.
When scrutinized at the individual asset class level, our calculations show that the 
negative asset allocation effect is on average largest in the Croatian stocks asset 
class. The total tactical asset allocation effect for the Croatian stocks asset class in 
the average fund is -867 basis points. Total allocation effects are much lower for 
other asset classes: +281 basis points for global stocks, -261 basis points for 
Croatian government bonds, -58 for Euro-zone government bonds and +103 for 
cash equivalents. As figure 4 very clearly shows, most of the negative tactical as-
set allocation effect was accumulated in 2008 during the stock market crash. This 
happened because funds had gradually increased their exposure to Croatian stocks 
during the previous three years and started 2008 over-weighted in that particular 
asset class. Actual allocation to individual asset classes at monthly level can be 
seen in appendix. Moreover, changes in regulation allowed them to purchase 
Croatian stocks in lower trading segments of the Zagreb Stock Exchange from 
December 2007. According to evidence, pension funds actively increased their 
positions in Croatian stocks during the 2008 crisis. This further exacerbated the 
negative tactical allocation effect as Croatian stocks did not recover when most of 
the global stock markets did.  
These results suggest that Croatian pension fund managers make poor tactical as-
set allocation decisions while at the same time excel at security selection. This 
result, in our opinion, needs to be interpreted with care. First of all, as we have 
seen, it is a very difficult task to determine policy weights due to inherent prob-
lems with Croatian asset classes and changes in regulation during the covered 
period. Secondly, since we do not have data on actual performance of the indi-
vidual asset classes in funds, our security selection effect is a residual value (see 
equation (6)). The selection effect as calculated in our study encompasses not 
only security selection and interaction as defined at the beginning of this paper, 
but also foreign exchange gains and losses from active foreign currency bets and 
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259trading, etc.). If the funds, for example, experienced large positive effects from 
hedging currency exposure, the real allocation effect would be more positive than 
the results suggest and the real security selection select would be lower. It is also 
worth noting that the selection effect could be that high because of the influence 
of trading by pension funds on market prices (“market impact”). This is particu-
larly relevant for the Croatian stocks asset class where high volatility, poor diver-
sification and low trading volumes compared to assets under management of the 
pension funds could easily have caused outperformance as a side effect of the 
market impact either by overweighting stocks considered fundamentally attrac-
tive by the portfolio managers or as a deliberate attempt by the portfolio managers 
to take advantage of the market impact to beat their peers or internal benchmarks. 
As previously mentioned, we were not able to calculate selection effects at asset 
class level. However, figure 5 suggests that most of the positive selection effect 
was cumulated during the stock market crash of 2008 – the same period during 
which negative allocation effects were cumulated. During 2008, the total negative 
allocation effect for the Croatian stocks asset class was -826 basis points (103% of 
the total allocation effect over the study period) while the total positive selection 
effect during the same period was 1,642 basis points (over 80% of the total selec-
tion effect over the study period). That might imply that the positive selection ef-
fect on the Croatian stocks asset class during the 2008 market crash was larger 
than the negative asset allocation effect on the same asset class. Unfortunately, 
data are not available to confirm or reject that hypothesis. Detailed calculations of 
allocation and selection effects at monthly level are given in appendix. 
Figure 4
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260 Figure 5 
Active return, allocation and selection effect for the average fund from 2005 to 
2014 (%) 
 “The Brinson group’s study concluded that active management through the selec-
tion of individual securities and tactical asset allocation resulted, on average, in a 
loss of 1.1% for the pension funds, compared with what would have been earned 
if the fund managers had passively invested at the strategic asset allocation” (Ho-
ernemann, Junkans and Zarate, 2005:26-27). Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) also 
explore what portion of the return level is explained by policy return. They calcu-
lated the percentage of fund return explained by policy return for each fund as the 
ratio of compound annual policy return divided by the compound annual total re-
turn for the actual fund. “A fund that stayed exactly at its policy mix and invested 
passively will have a ratio of 1.0, or 100 percent, whereas a fund that outper-
formed its policy will have a ratio less than 1.0” (Ibbotson and Kaplan, 2000:32). 
The authors performed calculations on the data sets used in the Brinson studies 
and their own study and showed that on average, policy accounted for a little more 
than all of total return. Our study, like the studies conducted in Brinson, Hood and 
Beebower (1986) and Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) in the United States, concludes 
that investment policy provides the largest portion of return. This is not surprising 
as pension funds are long-term investors and tend to stick to strategic allocation. 
In addition, because they usually manage large portfolios, they cannot make quick 
changes in asset allocation. However, the results of active management, using the 
example of Croatian pension funds, are positive. Our study shows that the average 
mandatory fund manager in Croatia added 77 basis points on average per year 
through active asset management. Croatian pension funds outperformed the po-
licy portfolio showing an average ratio of compounded annual returns, calculated 
as in Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000), of 0.87. More surprising is the size of the asset 



















































































































39 (3) 245-278 (2015)
261allocation and security selection effects. Insufficiency of data prevents us from 
giving a precise interpretation of such results, but the size and the volatility of 
Croatian stocks seem to be the main cause behind them.   
As mentioned earlier, we also conducted an analysis with policy weights defined 
as in table 4. A different investment policy resulted in a policy return over the ten 
year period of 71.2% instead of 63.71%. The average pension fund still outper-
formed the benchmark, this time by 29 basis points per year. 
6 conclUsIon 
Our study suggests that the average mandatory pension fund manager in Croatia 
has succeeded in adding value to pension fund members through active invest-
ment decisions. According to our calculations, the annual compound effect on 
returns is 77 basis points. The very wide range of active returns achieved by the 
fund management companies suggests that active investment management deci-
sions actually can add or destroy significant value for the pension funds’ members 
despite regulatory investment limits. Calculations show that funds have on aver-
age exhibited negative asset allocation and positive security selection effects. Un-
fortunately, due to lack of data on actual performance at asset class level we can-
not determine precisely the sources of this positive return in security selection. 
Most of the negative asset allocation effect was cumulated during the stock mar-
ket crash of 2008 when pension funds were overweighted in Croatian stocks. This 
asset class demonstrated the highest standard deviation of monthly returns com-
bined with poor long term performance and lack of liquidity that prevented the 
swift implementation of tactical allocation decisions. Clearly, the lack of publicly 
available and investible total return benchmark indices for the Croatian market is 
an obstacle for the development of adequate benchmarking and performance as-
sessment of pension funds. The creation, for example, of Croatian equity “size” 
benchmarks (e.g. large, mid and small caps) that would also take into considera-
tion free float would make it easier to create “realistic” benchmarks for institu-
tional investors. Obviously, retroactive calculation of total returns of such indices, 
or at least the Crobextr index, would tremendously facilitate any historical analy-
sis. Similarly, the calculation and publication of a HRK money market index and 
total return indices of the Croatian government bonds universe (local and interna-
tional bonds) would help in the achievement of comparability and would certainly 
give credibility to any kind of performance assessment, reporting or advertising 
by pension or investment fund managers. We believe that investible benchmarks 
and unambiguous performance attribution results would bring long-term benefits 
for both fund managers and members of the pension funds. Firstly, fund managers 
would explain more easily and clearly to their clients what is happening with their 
pension assets. This is particularly important in times of turmoil on financial mar-
kets. Secondly, it would be easier to determine and rank the quality of portfolio 
management in the medium and long term. Ultimately, this would lead to more 
competition, a focus on sustainable returns and additional improvement of the 
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262 aPPenDIx
Monthly allocations, returns, allocation and selection effects (2005-2014)




DS 3.50 3.57  15.72  -0.02  
GS 6.59 7.84  0.31  0.00  
DB 82.03 74.15  -0.25  -0.09  
EB 1.67 1.15  -0.35  -0.01  
MM 6.20 13.30  0.47  0.00  




DS 3.66 3.57  9.42  0.01  
GS 7.13 7.84  1.71  -0.02  
DB 77.71 74.15  -0.57  -0.04  
EB 1.56 1.15  -1.21  -0.01  
MM 9.93 13.30  0.43  -0.02  





DS 3.72 3.57  -16.55  -0.04  
GS 7.95 7.84  -1.22  0.00  
DB 67.68 74.15  -1.01  -0.04  
EB 1.05 1.15  -0.21  0.00  
MM 19.60 13.30  0.75  0.23  





DS 2.85 3.57  -2.43  0.03  
GS 7.97 7.84  -3.28  -0.01  
DB 77.22 74.15  0.33  0.02  
EB 1.01 1.15  0.41  0.00  
MM 10.94 13.30  0.51  -0.02  





DS 4.04 3.57  0.00  0.00  
GS 8.30 7.84  4.60  0.03  
DB 73.99 74.15  0.04  0.00  
EB 0.95 1.15  0.30  0.00  
MM 12.71 13.30  0.43  0.00  




DS 4.30 3.57  8.89  0.09  
GS 8.05 7.84  4.76  0.01  
DB 74.15 74.15  1.31  0.00  
EB 1.34 1.15  1.18  0.00  
MM 12.16 13.30  0.40  0.03  




DS 2.65 3.57  0.69  0.00  
GS 7.44 7.84  3.11  -0.02  
DB 68.91 74.15  0.09  0.03  
EB 2.38 1.15  -0.67  -0.02  
MM 18.62 13.30  0.45  0.01  
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DS 2.09 3.57  0.00  0.04  
GS 7.38 7.84  0.80  0.01  
DB 76.65 74.15  1.75  0.01  
EB 3.57 1.15  2.19  0.03  
MM 10.32 13.30  0.51  0.05  




DS 1.96 3.57  8.71  -0.17  
GS 7.01 7.84  4.77  -0.03  
DB 76.77 74.15  2.08  -0.01  
EB 4.83 1.15  0.72  -0.10  
MM 9.43 13.30  0.57  0.11  





DS 2.30 3.57  0.76  -0.03  
GS 7.88 7.84  -3.94  0.00  
DB 74.82 74.15  -0.68  0.00  
EB 2.99 1.15  -1.87  -0.04  
MM 12.03 13.30  0.46  -0.03  





DS 2.82 3.57  1.10  0.00  
GS 8.89 7.84  6.55  0.10  
DB 74.33 74.15  0.22  0.00  
EB 2.78 1.15  0.17  -0.02  
MM 11.18 13.30  0.40  0.01  





DS 3.07 3.57  -0.03  0.00  
GS 9.38 7.84  1.71  0.03  
DB 71.09 74.15  0.22  0.01  
EB 2.30 1.15  0.68  0.01  
MM 14.17 13.30  0.65  0.00  




DS 3.26 3.57  4.31  -0.02  
GS 9.46 7.84  2.10  0.04  
DB 75.78 74.15  0.49  -0.01  
EB 2.29 1.15  -0.91  -0.03  
MM 9.21 13.30  0.44  0.02  




DS 3.24 3.57  3.31  -0.02  
GS 10.16 7.84  1.03  0.04  
DB 77.24 74.15  -0.31  -0.02  
EB 2.36 1.15  -0.59  -0.01  
MM 7.00 13.30  0.41  -0.04  





DS 3.05 3.57  16.99  -0.15  
GS 8.90 7.84  0.55  0.01  
DB 78.12 74.15  -1.20  -0.07  
EB 2.14 1.15  -1.19  -0.02  
MM 7.79 13.30  0.39  -0.06  
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DS 7.86 3.57  7.10  0.58  
GS 8.04 7.84  -1.33  0.00  
DB 73.70 74.15  -1.29  0.00  
EB 2.59 1.15  -1.21  -0.01  
MM 7.82 13.30  0.36  -0.11  





DS 7.80 3.57  -0.36  0.01  
GS 7.43 7.84  -6.03  0.04  
DB 73.27 74.15  -0.14  -0.01  
EB 3.12 1.15  -0.21  0.01  
MM 8.38 13.30  0.40  -0.08  




DS 8.67 3.57  14.05  1.18  
GS 6.65 7.84  2.44  -0.04  
DB 74.37 74.15  -0.62  0.00  
EB 2.45 1.15  -0.27  -0.01  
MM 7.86 13.30  0.40  -0.01  




DS 7.32 3.57  6.30  0.35  
GS 6.76 7.84  -0.61  0.03  
DB 71.60 74.15  0.73  0.00  
EB 2.21 1.15  1.10  0.01  
MM 12.12 13.30  0.40  0.01  





DS 8.17 3.57  2.98  0.10  
GS 6.93 7.84  2.31  -0.01  
DB 76.80 74.15  1.69  0.00  
EB 0.92 1.15  1.97  0.00  
MM 7.19 13.30  0.39  0.13  




DS 7.47 3.57  -0.29  -0.08  
GS 6.61 7.84  3.40  -0.05  
DB 75.43 74.15  0.80  0.00  
EB 0.59 1.15  1.54  -0.01  
MM 9.90 13.30  0.39  0.03  





DS 7.65 3.57  6.38  0.38  
GS 6.70 7.84  3.05  -0.04  
DB 75.50 74.15  0.40  -0.01  
EB 0.89 1.15  0.13  0.00  
MM 9.26 13.30  0.36  0.03  





DS 5.25 3.57  0.30  0.00  
GS 5.98 7.84  -1.40  0.05  
DB 74.34 74.15  0.45  0.00  
EB 2.21 1.15  0.02  0.00  
MM 12.24 13.30  0.37  0.00  
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DS 6.87 3.57  18.46  0.99  
GS 6.13 7.84  2.10  -0.04  
DB 76.65 74.15  -0.16  -0.04  
EB 1.96 1.15  -1.06  -0.02  
MM 8.39 13.30  0.38  0.03  




DS 9.64 15.81  17.48  -1.48  
GS 6.58 8.71  3.22  -0.01  
DB 76.06 67.29  -0.04  -0.45  
EB 1.82 1.26  -0.04  -0.03  
MM 5.90 6.94  0.33  0.05  




DS 14.47 15.81  1.17  -0.01  
GS 6.83 8.71  -2.76  0.10  
DB 70.46 67.29  0.81  0.02  
EB 1.47 1.26  0.69  0.00  
MM 6.76 6.94  0.33  0.00  





DS 14.18 15.81  11.88  -0.26  
GS 6.29 8.71  1.46  0.03  
DB 72.69 67.29  0.43  -0.17  
EB 1.04 1.26  0.07  0.01  
MM 5.79 6.94  0.40  0.04  





DS 16.07 15.81  9.13  0.03  
GS 7.05 8.71  1.99  -0.01  
DB 71.02 67.29  0.12  -0.10  
EB 1.05 1.26  -0.30  0.01  
MM 4.80 6.94  0.37  0.05  





DS 17.05 15.81  8.15  0.15  
GS 7.54 8.71  3.28  -0.05  
DB 68.16 67.29  -0.89  -0.03  
EB 1.56 1.26  -1.99  -0.02  
MM 5.68 6.94  0.36  0.01  




DS 16.93 15.81  -2.60  -0.03  
GS 8.41 8.71  -1.08  0.00  
DB 65.96 67.29  -0.52  -0.01  
EB 1.49 1.26  -0.63  0.00  
MM 7.21 6.94  0.40  0.01  




DS 17.44 15.81  4.49  0.10  
GS 7.43 8.71  -3.75  0.10  
DB 63.86 67.29  0.40  0.02  
EB 2.13 1.26  1.36  0.01  
MM 9.14 6.94  0.42  -0.01  
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DS 17.13 15.81  -5.31  -0.11  
GS 7.94 8.71  0.58  -0.02  
DB 65.95 67.29  0.20  -0.02  
EB 0.68 1.26  1.20  -0.02  
MM 8.30 6.94  0.45  0.02  




DS 14.58 15.81  6.08  -0.11  
GS 7.95 8.71  0.16  0.01  
DB 67.11 67.29  -0.15  0.00  
EB 0.60 1.26  -0.51  0.02  
MM 9.77 6.94  0.40  -0.02  





DS 18.98 15.81  1.97  0.03  
GS 6.64 8.71  2.46  -0.04  
DB 64.78 67.29  1.13  0.01  
EB 0.53 1.26  1.74  0.00  
MM 9.07 6.94  0.51  -0.03  





DS 21.71 15.81  -8.87  -0.61  
GS 5.65 8.71  -6.80  0.21  
DB 65.66 67.29  -1.43  -0.04  
EB 0.31 1.26  0.14  -0.05  
MM 6.67 6.94  0.44  -0.02  





DS 17.61 15.81  12.77  0.31  
GS 5.00 8.71  -0.83  0.20  
DB 67.77 67.29  0.69  -0.01  
EB 0.26 1.26  -0.15  0.04  
MM 9.36 6.94  0.49  -0.08  




DS 26.95 15.81  -13.95  -2.02  
GS 3.88 8.71  -9.29  0.48  
DB 65.08 67.29  -1.05  -0.10  
EB 0.25 1.26  1.32  -0.09  
MM 3.84 6.94  0.51  -0.23  




DS 25.26 15.81  -5.66  -0.83  
GS 3.78 8.71  -2.07  0.13  
DB 66.48 67.29  0.80  -0.02  
EB 0.25 1.26  0.91  -0.02  
MM 4.22 6.94  0.47  -0.04  





DS 22.70 15.81  -8.92  -0.83  
GS 3.33 8.71  -5.66  0.35  
DB 66.32 67.29  -0.07  -0.03  
EB 0.25 1.26  -0.89  -0.02  
MM 7.40 6.94  0.45  0.02  
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DS 22.44 15.81  -1.12  -0.24  
GS 5.28 8.71  6.89  -0.34  
DB 66.60 67.29  0.80  0.00  
EB 0.25 1.26  -0.52  0.03  
MM 5.43 6.94  0.43  0.01  





DS 22.02 15.81  5.41  0.46  
GS 5.48 8.71  1.80  -0.04  
DB 65.81 67.29  -0.07  0.03  
EB 0.24 1.26  -1.51  0.04  
MM 6.45 6.94  0.46  0.00  




DS 22.47 15.81  -9.82  -0.85  
GS 5.58 8.71  -9.60  0.39  
DB 62.99 67.29  -0.16  -0.17  
EB 0.79 1.26  -1.10  -0.01  
MM 8.17 6.94  0.45  0.06  




DS 20.58 15.81  1.65  0.10  
GS 5.09 8.71  -1.63  0.12  
DB 62.51 67.29  0.29  0.01  
EB 1.08 1.26  1.72  0.00  
MM 10.75 6.94  0.47  0.01  





DS 23.35 15.81  -3.68  -0.45  
GS 5.70 8.71  3.40  -0.18  
DB 61.17 67.29  0.09  -0.03  
EB 1.04 1.26  0.32  0.00  
MM 8.73 6.94  0.47  0.02  




DS 23.75 15.81  -14.21  -1.52  
GS 5.39 8.71  -10.04  0.39  
DB 60.49 67.29  -0.27  -0.36  
EB 0.69 1.26  -0.10  -0.03  
MM 9.68 6.94  0.46  0.18  





DS 22.17 15.81  -26.53  -2.20  
GS 5.21 8.71  -10.65  0.20  
DB 61.26 67.29  -3.52  -0.43  
EB 0.68 1.26  2.03  -0.10  
MM 10.68 6.94  0.62  0.54  





DS 15.07 15.81  -26.49  0.27  
GS 4.41 8.71  -5.29  -0.04  
DB 65.97 67.29  -1.90  -0.09  
EB 2.77 1.26  2.99  0.24  
MM 11.77 6.94  0.71  0.56  
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DS 13.13 15.81  7.42  -0.16  
GS 4.27 8.71  -3.94  0.57  
DB 75.57 67.29  4.34  0.07  
EB 2.40 1.26  3.89  0.00  
MM 4.63 6.94  0.68  0.12  




DS 13.92 15.81  -2.11  0.06  
GS 4.34 8.71  1.30  -0.12  
DB 73.65 67.29  -0.17  0.01  
EB 2.26 1.26  -0.46  0.00  
MM 5.84 6.94  0.67  -0.02  




DS 13.40 15.81  -17.52  0.60  
GS 3.40 8.71  -8.44  0.49  
DB 72.23 67.29  0.41  0.31  
EB 2.48 1.26  1.20  0.09  
MM 8.49 6.94  0.91  0.11  





DS 12.19 15.81  5.15  -0.25  
GS 2.66 8.71  4.25  -0.33  
DB 72.68 67.29  -0.44  -0.13  
EB 2.48 1.26  1.95  0.02  
MM 9.98 6.94  1.12  0.01  





DS 11.78 15.81  10.08  -0.53  
GS 3.06 8.71  10.24  -0.77  
DB 72.44 67.29  -0.66  -0.24  
EB 2.71 1.26  0.25  -0.04  
MM 10.01 6.94  0.81  -0.07  





DS 12.55 15.81  34.89  -1.51  
GS 3.52 8.71  1.17  0.44  
DB 70.45 67.29  1.07  -0.27  
EB 2.73 1.26  -2.58  -0.21  
MM 10.76 6.94  0.77  -0.35  




DS 15.31 15.81  -11.34  0.08  
GS 2.78 8.71  -0.45  -0.16  
DB 67.84 67.29  -0.40  0.02  
EB 1.94 1.26  0.75  0.03  
MM 12.13 6.94  0.73  0.25  




DS 13.65 15.81  -0.67  0.09  
GS 3.56 8.71  8.58  -0.58  
DB 68.95 67.29  1.66  -0.01  
EB 2.02 1.26  2.33  0.01  
MM 11.81 6.94  0.78  -0.09  
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DS 13.76 15.81  7.19  -0.16  
GS 4.92 8.71  2.08  0.02  
DB 65.46 67.29  1.60  0.03  
EB 2.08 1.26  0.36  -0.03  
MM 13.78 6.94  0.79  -0.19  




DS 14.65 15.81  9.65  -0.13  
GS 4.53 8.71  1.79  0.09  
DB 63.77 67.29  1.91  0.06  
EB 2.17 1.26  0.09  -0.04  
MM 14.88 6.94  0.76  -0.30  





DS 16.40 15.81  -2.15  -0.02  
GS 3.95 8.71  -4.37  0.34  
DB 61.38 67.29  0.71  -0.09  
EB 2.12 1.26  -0.71  -0.01  
MM 16.16 6.94  0.72  0.14  





DS 16.69 15.81  -3.39  -0.09  
GS 4.00 8.71  4.91  -0.17  
DB 61.04 67.29  4.21  -0.15  
EB 3.69 1.26  1.91  -0.04  
MM 14.58 6.94  0.67  -0.27  





DS 17.37 15.81  -2.80  -0.10  
GS 4.77 8.71  5.60  -0.31  
DB 59.98 67.29  1.20  -0.04  
EB 3.37 1.26  -0.95  -0.07  
MM 14.51 6.94  0.50  -0.05  




DS 17.17 15.81  10.22  0.18  
GS 5.38 8.71  -1.36  0.20  
DB 59.79 67.29  1.15  0.15  
EB 3.21 1.26  0.56  -0.06  
MM 14.44 6.94  0.51  -0.22  




DS 18.74 15.81  -2.72  -0.14  
GS 5.89 8.71  3.46  -0.16  
DB 58.08 67.29  0.21  -0.03  
EB 3.01 1.26  0.56  0.02  
MM 14.29 6.94  0.35  0.04  





DS 19.28 15.81  0.47  -0.02  
GS 6.88 8.71  7.20  -0.20  
DB 57.66 67.29  0.09  0.11  
EB 2.92 1.26  0.51  -0.01  
MM 13.25 6.94  0.38  -0.04  
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DS 16.91 15.81  1.11  0.01  
GS 8.29 8.71  1.52  -0.01  
DB 62.72 67.29  0.53  0.01  
EB 2.81 1.26  -0.80  -0.04  
MM 9.26 6.94  0.35  -0.01  





DS 16.29 15.81  -7.86  -0.05  
GS 8.81 8.71  -3.32  0.00  
DB 62.10 67.29  0.21  -0.14  
EB 2.43 1.26  1.76  0.06  
MM 10.36 6.94  0.35  0.10  




DS 15.81 15.81  -6.37  0.00  
GS 9.39 8.71  -2.69  0.00  
DB 62.53 67.29  -1.71  -0.06  
EB 2.05 1.26  -1.71  0.01  
MM 10.23 6.94  0.27  0.15  




DS 14.60 15.81  0.32  0.02  
GS 9.28 8.71  2.23  0.01  
DB 60.33 67.29  1.46  -0.02  
EB 1.86 1.26  1.76  0.00  
MM 13.94 6.94  0.34  -0.11  





DS 14.23 15.81  -0.21  0.03  
GS 8.13 8.71  -1.27  0.02  
DB 70.25 67.29  1.45  0.03  
EB 1.51 1.26  2.76  0.01  
MM 5.88 6.94  0.35  0.01  




DS 14.21 15.81  3.91  -0.07  
GS 8.20 8.71  2.49  -0.01  
DB 69.43 67.29  0.67  -0.02  
EB 1.74 1.26  -0.74  -0.02  
MM 6.43 6.94  0.33  0.01  





DS 15.62 15.81  -2.17  0.01  
GS 9.27 8.71  2.76  0.02  
DB 67.08 67.29  1.14  0.00  
EB 1.64 1.26  0.15  0.00  
MM 6.39 6.94  0.35  0.00  





DS 15.37 15.81  -4.16  0.03  
GS 10.88 8.71  3.59  0.13  
DB 66.56 67.29  0.65  -0.01  
EB 1.47 1.26  -1.61  -0.01  
MM 5.71 6.94  0.33  0.00  
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DS 14.67 15.81  18.41  -0.28  
GS 10.17 8.71  6.30  0.07  
DB 69.67 67.29  -0.35  -0.14  
EB 1.08 1.26  -0.92  0.01  
MM 4.41 6.94  0.30  0.12  




DS 18.35 15.81  8.88  0.31  
GS 10.87 8.71  -0.95  -0.09  
DB 66.56 67.29  0.48  0.01  
EB 1.00 1.26  -0.10  0.01  
MM 3.21 6.94  0.31  0.08  




DS 19.10 15.81  -2.00  -0.13  
GS 10.45 8.71  3.19  0.08  
DB 64.86 67.29  0.64  -0.01  
EB 0.97 1.26  0.01  0.00  
MM 4.62 6.94  0.28  0.01  





DS 18.46 15.81  2.46  0.08  
GS 10.85 8.71  -3.43  -0.15  
DB 64.08 67.29  1.00  -0.01  
EB 0.97 1.26  -1.10  0.01  
MM 5.65 6.94  0.32  0.01  





DS 18.48 15.81  -2.22  -0.10  
GS 13.82 8.71  -1.65  -0.13  
DB 63.60 67.29  0.54  -0.04  
EB 0.93 1.26  -0.23  0.00  
MM 3.18 6.94  0.31  -0.03  





DS 18.63 15.81  2.27  0.02  
GS 13.94 8.71  2.99  0.11  
DB 63.28 67.29  1.67  0.01  
EB 0.91 1.26  2.06  0.00  
MM 3.24 6.94  0.27  0.09  




DS 18.89 15.81  -1.86  -0.05  
GS 14.35 8.71  -3.02  -0.21  
DB 62.63 67.29  -0.43  -0.03  
EB 0.91 1.26  -1.23  0.00  
MM 3.22 6.94  0.24  -0.07  




DS 17.51 15.81  -2.32  -0.06  
GS 13.59 8.71  -0.11  0.02  
DB 61.28 67.29  -0.07  -0.03  
EB 0.87 1.26  1.25  -0.01  
MM 6.76 6.94  0.23  0.00  
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DS 17.06 15.81  -6.20  -0.09  
GS 11.50 8.71  -7.62  -0.27  
DB 67.69 67.29  -0.55  0.01  
EB 0.37 1.26  2.89  -0.07  
MM 3.37 6.94  0.25  -0.14  




DS 16.70 15.81  -8.60  -0.11  
GS 11.46 8.71  -3.17  -0.07  
DB 68.16 67.29  -0.09  0.02  
EB 0.38 1.26  0.64  -0.03  
MM 3.31 6.94  0.26  -0.12  





DS 17.05 15.81  -0.39  -0.02  
GS 10.84 8.71  6.10  0.20  
DB 68.64 67.29  -0.08  -0.01  
EB 0.35 1.26  -2.02  0.04  
MM 3.12 6.94  0.29  0.01  





DS 16.84 15.81  -5.38  -0.06  
GS 9.65 8.71  3.22  0.09  
DB 67.75 67.29  -2.20  0.00  
EB 0.33 1.26  -2.79  0.01  
MM 5.44 6.94  0.33  -0.06  





DS 16.40 15.81  0.31  -0.01  
GS 10.42 8.71  4.08  0.07  
DB 66.62 67.29  1.84  0.00  
EB 0.33 1.26  4.30  -0.04  
MM 6.23 6.94  0.34  0.02  




DS 16.06 15.81  -0.49  0.00  
GS 11.85 8.71  4.03  0.18  
DB 67.47 67.29  0.48  0.00  
EB 0.33 1.26  2.20  -0.02  
MM 4.29 6.94  0.35  0.01  




DS 15.30 15.81  3.73  -0.01  
GS 10.37 8.71  2.50  0.01  
DB 67.30 67.29  2.14  0.00  
EB 0.33 1.26  2.03  0.00  
MM 6.70 6.94  0.37  0.01  





DS 14.51 15.81  2.85  -0.02  
GS 10.21 8.71  1.10  -0.02  
DB 68.79 67.29  1.93  0.00  
EB 0.32 1.26  -0.82  0.04  
MM 6.17 6.94  0.38  0.02  
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DS 14.60 15.81  -1.54  0.05  
GS 9.82 8.71  0.13  -0.01  
DB 68.13 67.29  1.63  0.01  
EB 0.31 1.26  0.28  0.01  
MM 7.13 6.94  0.38  0.00  





DS 14.25 15.81  -7.12  0.17  
GS 10.39 8.71  -2.59  -0.06  
DB 70.11 67.29  1.11  0.08  
EB 0.44 1.26  1.39  -0.03  
MM 4.92 6.94  0.40  -0.03  




DS 13.42 15.81  1.78  -0.04  
GS 10.56 8.71  3.36  0.08  
DB 71.25 67.29  0.32  -0.03  
EB 0.43 1.26  -1.26  0.03  
MM 4.33 6.94  0.36  0.02  




DS 13.58 15.81  0.51  0.02  
GS 10.13 8.71  3.87  0.07  
DB 70.05 67.29  0.82  -0.01  
EB 0.42 1.26  1.74  -0.01  
MM 5.81 6.94  0.30  0.01  





DS 12.87 15.81  -0.83  0.07  
GS 10.24 8.71  -0.25  -0.02  
DB 71.07 67.29  0.98  0.03  
EB 0.36 1.26  0.39  0.00  
MM 5.46 6.94  0.30  0.01  




DS 13.15 15.81  2.36  0.02  
GS 8.84 8.71  -0.72  -0.01  
DB 71.37 67.29  3.73  0.06  
EB 0.44 1.26  0.88  0.03  
MM 6.20 6.94  0.31  0.03  





DS 13.50 15.81  2.56  -0.01  
GS 10.52 8.71  0.34  -0.06  
DB 69.26 67.29  2.57  0.01  
EB 0.42 1.26  2.03  0.00  
MM 6.29 6.94  0.31  0.02  





DS 13.39 15.81  0.56  0.00  
GS 9.87 8.71  1.24  0.01  
DB 68.83 67.29  0.48  0.00  
EB 0.41 1.26  1.74  -0.02  
MM 7.49 6.94  0.25  0.00  
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DS 13.56 15.81  -0.88  0.05  
GS 11.16 8.71  0.35  0.00  
DB 67.71 67.29  0.78  0.00  
EB 0.41 1.26  0.82  -0.01  
MM 7.17 6.94  0.17  0.00  




DS 14.46 15.81  8.74  -0.13  
GS 10.87 8.71  2.66  -0.01  
DB 67.47 67.29  1.77  0.00  
EB 0.41 1.26  0.09  0.04  
MM 6.79 6.94  0.23  0.01  




DS 14.99 15.81  3.31  -0.04  
GS 12.23 8.71  3.77  0.20  
DB 65.61 67.29  -0.76  0.03  
EB 0.39 1.26  0.30  0.00  
MM 6.77 6.94  0.20  0.00  





DS 15.33 15.81  3.47  -0.02  
GS 12.77 8.71  4.51  0.24  
DB 65.24 67.29  0.01  0.03  
EB 0.50 1.26  0.54  0.01  
MM 6.16 6.94  0.20  0.01  





DS 14.43 15.81  -2.72  0.08  
GS 11.61 8.71  1.28  0.02  
DB 65.35 67.29  1.55  -0.03  
EB 0.24 1.26  2.80  -0.03  
MM 8.37 6.94  0.19  -0.01  





DS 14.80 15.81  -4.61  0.06  
GS 11.63 8.71  0.89  0.10  
DB 68.08 67.29  -0.64  0.01  
EB 0.24 1.26  -1.77  0.01  
MM 5.25 6.94  0.17  -0.04  




DS 14.71 15.81  -2.41  -0.01  
GS 10.56 8.71  -5.04  -0.08  
DB 67.28 67.29  -2.74  0.00  
EB 1.49 1.26  -2.93  0.00  
MM 5.95 6.94  0.16  -0.05  




DS 13.46 15.81  2.69  -0.02  
GS 10.60 8.71  4.14  0.06  
DB 66.15 67.29  2.13  0.00  
EB 1.41 1.26  1.33  0.00  
MM 8.39 6.94  0.18  -0.05  
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DS 12.85 15.81  -0.14  0.00  
GS 10.90 8.71  -1.04  -0.03  
DB 72.19 67.29  -0.14  0.00  
EB 1.50 1.26  0.22  0.00  
MM 2.55 6.94  0.18  -0.03  




DS 12.79 15.81  -1.43  0.12  
GS 10.67 8.71  3.80  0.10  
DB 72.55 67.29  1.12  0.02  
EB 1.49 1.26  1.61  0.00  
MM 2.50 6.94  0.17  0.05  





DS 12.82 15.81  -2.30  0.13  
GS 10.64 8.71  1.99  0.06  
DB 71.83 67.29  0.64  0.03  
EB 1.48 1.26  1.60  0.00  
MM 3.24 6.94  0.18  0.01  





DS 12.67 15.81  0.69  0.00  
GS 9.99 8.71  3.06  0.05  
DB 71.73 67.29  0.57  -0.02  
EB 1.66 1.26  0.46  0.00  
MM 3.95 6.94  0.17  0.03  





DS 13.22 15.81  1.50  -0.06  
GS 10.38 8.71  1.04  0.03  
DB 71.37 67.29  -0.32  -0.03  
EB 1.81 1.26  -0.54  -0.01  
MM 3.22 6.94  0.17  0.00  




DS 12.40 15.81  0.77  -0.01  
GS 11.33 8.71  -2.49  -0.13  
DB 69.27 67.29  0.84  0.01  
EB 1.80 1.26  2.48  0.02  
MM 5.19 6.94  0.17  0.01  




DS 14.06 15.81  -0.22  0.06  
GS 10.45 8.71  4.82  0.08  
DB 68.53 67.29  2.19  0.01  
EB 2.22 1.26  0.88  -0.02  
MM 4.74 6.94  0.18  0.06  





DS 12.09 15.81  -1.95  0.12  
GS 10.77 8.71  -0.45  -0.02  
DB 72.60 67.29  0.45  0.04  
EB 2.40 1.26  1.00  0.02  
MM 2.15 6.94  0.18  -0.02  








































































39 (3) 245-278 (2015)





DS 11.87 15.81  -2.11  0.15  
GS 10.84 8.71  -0.62  -0.03  
DB 72.54 67.29  0.75  0.06  
EB 1.58 1.26  0.27  0.00  
MM 3.17 6.94  0.16  0.00  





DS 11.89 15.81  1.46  0.00  
GS 10.94 8.71  3.63  0.08  
DB 71.32 67.29  1.33  -0.01  
EB 1.65 1.26  0.72  0.00  
MM 4.19 6.94  0.16  0.06  




DS 12.27 15.81  5.45  -0.22  
GS 11.54 8.71  1.56  -0.01  
DB 71.34 67.29  1.15  -0.04  
EB 1.40 1.26  0.89  0.00  
MM 3.45 6.94  0.16  0.10  




DS 11.70 15.81  1.48  -0.04  
GS 12.34 8.71  0.81  -0.01  
DB 72.91 67.29  0.84  -0.01  
EB 3.19 1.26  1.81  0.03  
MM 1.75 6.94  0.17  0.06  





DS 11.76 15.81  2.07  -0.08  
GS 12.24 8.71  3.80  0.17  
DB 71.11 67.29  0.24  -0.04  
EB 1.09 1.26  1.68  0.00  
MM 3.80 6.94  0.16  0.04  




DS 12.20 15.81  3.86  -0.13  
GS 12.64 8.71  1.13  -0.04  
DB 70.85 67.29  1.46  -0.01  
EB 0.99 1.26  0.10  0.01  
MM 3.33 6.94  0.16  0.09  





DS 12.55 15.81  -4.14  0.22  
GS 13.07 8.71  1.87  0.15  
DB 69.81 67.29  0.52  0.03  
EB 0.99 1.26  0.71  0.00  
MM 3.59 6.94  0.15  -0.02  





DS 12.05 15.81  -2.54  0.20  
GS 13.79 8.71  3.27  0.22  
DB 69.78 67.29  1.11  0.02  
EB 0.73 1.26  1.44  -0.01  
MM 3.65 6.94  0.15  0.03  
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DS 12.05 15.81  -2.60  0.14  
GS 13.99 8.71  0.60  0.09  
DB 68.16 67.29  -0.02  0.00  
EB 0.71 1.26  0.69  -0.01  
MM 5.09 6.94  0.15  -0.02  






DS      -8.67  
GS      2.81  
DB      -2.61  
EB      -0.58  
MM      1.03  
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